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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2008, James Greaves ("Greaves") and Appellee, Nathan Lloyd Archibald ("Archibald"),
founded a company, the Appellant in this matter, Brand Makers Promotional Products, LLC.
("Brand Makers"). Prior to December 2011, Brand Makers lent money and continued to lend
money to Archibald for personal attorney's fees for legal matters between Archibald and a
company he had formerly worked for, In the Paint, LLC. ("In the Paint"). In June of 2013, Brand
Makers and Archibald separated and signed a severance and non-compete agreement. In
violation of the non-compete agreement, Archibald went to work for IPROMOTEU, a direct
competitor of Brand Makers, by May 2014, perhaps sooner. After repeated unsuccessful
emails, text messages and phone calls between Greaves, Brand Makers and Archibald
discussing both Brand Makers desire to be repaid and Archibald's desire to repay Brand Makers,
Brand Makers filed the current legal action in September 2013 for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, fraud and conversion. After discovering the violation of the non-compete
agreement, Brand Makers filed an Amended Complaint in February 2016.
After over three years of litigation, three attorneys for Archibald, one default judgment
which was improperly set aside, multiple continuations of hearings due to the unpreparedness
of Archibald, one last second continuation of trial, this case was finally tried on December 16,
2016. Throughout the proceedings, Archibald never disputed the fact that he had agreed to
repay the attorney's fees but simply stated he was not sure how much he owed and that he
assumed it was around $19,000. Archibald also never disputed that he went to work for
IPROMOTEU in violation of the separation agreement, again he only disputed the amount he
made while working for Brand Makers' competitor.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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After the trial, the trial court cut and pasted or otherwise copied Archibald's own post
trial findings of fact and conclusions of law almost word for word. The trial court somehow
determined that although Archibald had not breached any contract because he always
"planned" on paying, Brand Makers was entitled to a judgment of $5,776.00 for damages on
two of the counts found in the Amended Complaint. However, the trial court then found
Archibald to be the "overall" prevailing party and awarded him $16,035.00 in attorney's fees
completely toppling Brand Makers ever so small victory on the merits of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2008, James Greaves and Archibald founded Brand Makers. 1 Greaves and Archibald
each owned 50% of Brand Makers from its inception until February 2010. 2 In February 2010,
Brand Makers was in default on loans made by Greaves father, Thomas Greaves. 3 Pursuant to a
security agreement4 , Thomas Greaves took control of 100% of Brand Makers in February 2010. 5
From February 2010 through 2013, Archibald was an independent sales representative of Brand
Makers. 6 Prior to December, 2011, Archibald had incurred substantial legal fees in a matter
unrelated to this matter. 7 On December 6, 2011, Archibald and Brand Makers entered into a
Loan Agreement whereby Brand Makers agreed to loan Archibald $51,986.00 to allow him to
pay the legal fees. 8 Greaves testified that in April, May, June, July, and October 2012, Brand

1

TR Vol. Ip. 228 L. 24 - p. 229 L. 2.
TR Vol. Ip. 229 LI. 3-15.
3
TR Vol. Ip. 119 LI. 5-8.
2

4

For a more detailed account of the facts regarding Thomas Greaves takeover of Brand Makers see In re

Archibald, 482 8.R. 378, 388 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012) which is referenced numerous times throughout the trial.
5
TR Vol. Ip. 119 LI. 5-23.
6
TR Vol. Ip. 53 LI. 4-10 & p. 44 L. 9 ..
7
TR Vol. Ip. 13 LI. 11-24.
8
R Vol. I p. 320 & Trial Exhibit No. 8 at p. 7
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Makers made additional express or implied loans to Archibald in the form of payments to
Archibald's legal counsel to cover his continuing legal fees. 9 Those additional payments totaled
$68,037.50. 10 Between the written loan agreement and the additional payments made to
Archibald's attorney, Brand Makers made a total of $120,023.50 in payments for Archibald's
legal fees. Between January 2012, and March 2013, Archibald repaid $48,710.00 by way of
deductions from Archibald's commissions from Brand Makers_l1
As a sales representative Archibald serviced an account named Just for Does. 12 Brand
Makers did not receive full payment for the account. 13 Brand Makers lost $22,482.53 on the
account. Pursuant to the representative agreement between Brand Makers and Archibald,
Archibald is responsible for the loss to Brand Makers at Archibald's commission rate. 14
Archibald's commission rate was 50% and thus Archibald would be responsible for 50% of the
loss to Brand Makers from the account. 15
In August 2011, Archibald represented to Brand Makers that he was in urgent need of
money and Brand Makers agreed to send him $2,500.00. 16 In return Archibald was to send
Brand Makers a check for the same amount postdated to the next payday. 17 Archibald
represented to Brand Makers that he did not receive the check and Brand Makers transferred

9

TR Vol. I p.182 L. 17 -p. 183 L. 24.

10

Trial Exhibit No. 10 at pp. 8-18. See also Exhibit No. 27 at p. 160 (admitted for the illustrative purpose of showing
the total amounts of the invoices making up Exhibits No. 10 & No. 11.
11

TR Vol. Ip. 45 LI. 17-25. See also Exhibit No. 11 at pp. 36-85 & See also Exhibit No. 27 at p. 160 (admitted for the
illustrative purpose of showing the total amounts of the invoices making up Exhibit No. 10 & No. 11.
12
TR Vol. Ip. 150 L. 2 - p. 161 L. 24 & p. 222 L. 17 -p. 224.
13
Id.
14

TR Vol. Ip. 264 L. 17 -p. 266 L. 16. Trial Exhibit No. 25 at p. 125 paragraph 5.5.2.
TR Vol. Ip. 150 L. 2 - p. 161 L. 24 & p. 222 L. 17 - p. 224 L. 23 & p. 144 L. 21-p. 145 L. 19. See also Exhibit No. 27
at p. 160 (for the total Just for Does amounts).
16
TR Vol. I p.63 L. 1- p. 74 L. 22 & p. 204 L. 7 - p. 206 L. 11 & p. 254 I. 13 -p. 257 L. 13.
17 Id.
15
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$2,500.00 to Archibald. 18 Archibald subsequently represented to Brand Makers that he
shredded the first check. Archibald received the transfer but did not send his check to Brand
Makers as agreed. Brand Makers withheld $2,500.00 from Archibald's commissions in
September 2011. 19 On October 15, 2011, Archibald cashed the initial check. 20
In connection with Archibald's termination as an independent sales representative,
Brand Makers prepaid Archibald $10,000.00 as a draw against his expected future commissions.
Archibald's earned commissions for June and July 2013, were $7,428.85. 21 Archibald has never
repaid the remaining $2,571.15. 22
On or about June 20, 2013, Brand Makers and Archibald entered into a Severance,
Nonsolicitaf1on and Confidenf1ality Agreement. 23 The Nonsolicitation Agreement required, that
for a period of two years, Archibald not be involved in any activity that is directly competitive
with any of the business activities of Brand Makers nor shall Archibald solicit away any
customers. 24 The Nonsolicitation Agreement provided that as a remedy for breaching the
agreement, Archibald would be required to pay all profits and commissions received as a result
of any violation of the agreement to Brand Makers. 25 Archibald breached this contract by
directly competing with Brand Makers and by soliciting away current customers of Brand
Makers. 26

is Id.
19

20

Id.
Id.

21

R Vol. I p. 602.
Id.
23
Trial Exhibit #5 pp. 137-39.
,, Id.
22

is Id.
26

TR Vol 1. p. 84 L. 16-p. 86 L. 9.
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This matter was ultimately tried on December 16, 2017. 27 Following trial the parties
each submitted proposed findings and/or post trial briefs on January 6, 2017. 28 On January 27,
2017, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it almost word for
word copied Archibald's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 29
RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On September 27, 2013, Brand Makers filed the Complaint. 30 Brand Makers, with leave
of the court, filed an Amended Complaint on February 8, 2016. 31 Archibald filed an Answer on
March 7, 2016. 32 Brand Makers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with a supporting brief
and affidavit on May 23, 2016. 33 Archibald filed a motion to continue, an objection to summary
judgment and an affidavit on June 17, 2016, just three days before the hearing. 34The court held
a hearing on Brand Makers motion for summary judgment on June 20, 2016. 35 The court
ultimately accepted Archibald's untimely filings and gave Brand Makers and opportunity to
respond which it did on July 6, 2016. 36At the hearing Archibald requested a continuance so he
could respond to the motion, the court gave Brand Makers a chance to brief its objection which
it filed on June 16, 2017. 37 The District Court entered a Decision and Order Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment denying Brand Makers' motion on July 12, 2016. 38

27

R Vol.
R Vol.
29
R Vol.
70
R Vol.
31
R Vol.
32
R Vol.
33
R Vol.
34
R Vol.
35
R Vol.
36
R Vol.
37
R Vol.
38
R Vol.
28

I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.
I, pp.

586-95.
567-585. (Brand Maker's post trial memorandum did not make into the record on appeal).
598-609.
12-16.
278-84.
290-93.
312-482.
489-514.
483.
515-22.
483-88.
523-28.
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Trial was scheduled for July 18, 2016 and Archibald filed for a continuance on July 14,
2016 but failed to send Brand Makers notice of the motion, the court decided the motion ex
parte that very same day. 39 Archibald's third attorney, Paul Ziel, filed a Notice of Appearance
on November 18, 2016. 40 Trail was held on December 16, 2016. 41 The parties each submitted
proposed findings and/or post trial briefs on January 6, 2017. 42 The trial court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 27, 2017 43 and Judgment against Archibald
in the amount of $5,776.00 also on January 27, 2017. 44 Archibald filed a Motion for Costs and
Fees on February 10, 2017. 45 On February 13, 2017, counsel for Brand Makers filed an
Application staying the proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 5.1. 46 On February 22, 2017, the trial
court entered the Order staying proceedings until ten days after the adjournment of the Idaho
State Legislature. 47
On March 9, 2017, Brand Makers filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 48 The Appeal was
conditionally dismissed because this Court found that Judgment entered by the trial court was
not properly formatted. 49 On April 3, 2017, the trial court filed entered a Judgment awarding
Brand Makers damages in the amount of $5, 776.00. 50 On April 12, 2017, Brand Makers filed its
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs along with supporting documents. 51 Brand

19

R Vol.
R Vol.
41
R Vol.
42
R Vol.
41
R Vol.
44
R Vol.
45 R Vol.
46 R Vol.
47
R Vol.
48
R Vol.
49
R Vol.
so R Vol.
51
R Vol.
40

I, pp. 529-533.
I, pp. 539-40.
I, pp. 586-95.
I, pp. 567-585. (Brand Maker's post trial memorandum d"1d not make ·,nto the record on appeal).
I, pp. 598-609.
I, pp. 596-97.
I, pp. 610-11.
I, pp. 640-42.
I, pp. 643-45.
I, pp. 648-652.
I, pp. 656.
I, pp. 657-58.
I, pp. 696-97.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
Page 10 of 34
F:\CLIENTS\BNZ\8957 - Brand Makers\Pleadings\171212 Appellant's Brief On Appeal.docx

Makers files an Amended Notice of Appeal on April 24, 2017. 52 The trial court held a hearing on
the competing motions for attorney's fees on June 19, 2017. 53 The trial court issued its
Decision And Order Re: Attorney Fees on July 3, 2017. 54 On August 11, 2017, Brand Makers
filed a timely Second Amended Notice of Appeal which included an appeal of the recent
decision regarding attorney's fees. 55
I.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

IS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS
OF FACT AND ULTIMATELY THE JUDGMENT WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SITTING AS
THE FINDER OF FACT DISREGARDED THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL EVIDENCE?

B.

DO THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOW FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT?

C.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT NATHAN
LOYD ARCHIBALD WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND AWARDING HIM ATTORNEY'S
FEES?

D.

IS BRAND MAKERS ENTITLED TO ATTORENY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL?

11.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial is limited to ascertaining
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89, 129 P.3d
1235, 1237-38 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Ca., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812
P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses, this Court will liberally
construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v.

Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105,107,982 P.2d 940,942 (1999). This Court will not set aside a
trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz
52
53

54
55

R Vol. I, pp. 700-04.
Augmented R Vol. I, p. 9.
Augmented R Vol. I, pp. 10-14.
Augmented R Vol. I, pp. 15-19.
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Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 52(a). If the trial court
based its findings on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court
will not overturn those findings on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at
1238. Additionally, this Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial
court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. This Court exercises free review over
matters of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing
Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,760,992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999)).
Borah

v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009).
111.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE AT TRIAL DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT.
1. The Legal Fees Paid to Archibald's Attorneys in the In The Paint Litigation Were For
the Sole Benefit of Archibald and Because Thomas Greaves Was the Sole Owner of
Brand Makers There Was No Risk of In The Paint Seizing Fifty Percent of Brand
Maker's Assets.
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, incorrectly stated:
8. Even though Archibald bought out of his non-compete agreement with In
the Paint, In the Paint initiated a lawsuit against Archibald sometime in 2010. In
the Paint posted notice of intent to take default against Archibald on the door of
Brand Makers. If In the Paint prevailed against Archibald, In the Paint could have
seized at least fifty percent (50%) of Brand Maker's assets.
9. Greave's father purchased Brand Makers to help the company grow and to
shield Brand Makers from the legal liability it was facing from the In the Paint
lawsuit. It was beneficial for Brand Makers to pay for Archibald's legal bills
because In the Paint could have effectively effectuated a hostile takeover of
Brand Makers.
10. Brand Makers and Archi.bald as an individual, signed a Loan Agreement
("Loan Agreement") dated December 6, 2011. See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8. The
Loan Agreement specified that Brand Makers would lend Archibald $51, 986.
The Loan Agreement also set forth the terms for the repayment of the $51,986.
The Loan Agreement did not refer to any other monies owing. The Loan
Agreement did not refer to any other monies owing. The Loan Agreement
contained no provisions requiring Archibald to pay any bills incurred beyond the
$51,986.
11. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 shows that Greaves was more involved in the lawsuit

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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than Archibald and was responsible for a substantial portion of the bill. 56
The trial court's above findings of fact is not supported by the evidence at trial and are
factually incorrect. First, the trial court incorrectly states that "[e]ven though Archibald
bought out his non-compete agreement with In the Paint, In the Paint initiated a lawsuit
against Archibald sometime in 2010." However, the In the Paint litigation was not
brought as a result of a breach of non-compete but was brought as Archibald failed to
make payments on the $90,000 he paid to buy out of the non-compete. 57
Second, the trial court also incorrectly stated that "[i]f In the Paint prevailed against
Archibald, In the Paint could have seized at least fifty percent (50%) of Brand Maker's assets"
and that "[i]t was beneficial for Brand Makers to pay for Archibald's legal bills because In the
Paint could have effectively effectuated a hostile takeover of Brand Makers." There is
absolutely no evidence in the record for the position that had In the Paint prevailed they could
have seized 50% of Brand Maker's Assets. In fact the evidence in the record makes it clear that
Thomas Greaves had exercised his rights pursuant to a security agreement and taken control of
100% of Brand Maker's assets. 58 It would have been legally impossible for In the Paint to seize
any of Brand Maker's assets except for Archibald's future wages as Archibald did not own any
equity in Brand Makers.
It is also incorrect that Thomas Greaves "purchased Brand Makers to help the company
grow and to shield Brand Makers from the legal liability." Again, the clear evidence found in
the record is that Thomas Greaves took control of the company as he had loaned money to

56
57
58

R Vol. I p. 599.
TR Vol. I pp. 114 LI. 7 -p. 115 L. 8 & p. 231 L. 12 - p. 237 l. 7.
TR Vol. I p. 119 LI. 5-23.
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Brand Makers and Brand Makers had defaulted on the loans. 59 This is consistent with the
findings of facts in In re Archibald, 482 B.R. 378,388 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012) wherein that court
explained:
Brand Makers failed to make scheduled payments to Thomas Greaves and was in
default as of September 2009. On February 24, 2010, Thomas Greaves sent an e-mail
(February 2010 E-mail) addressed to James Greaves which stated:
I am writing this email to formalize what we have already discussed. In our
contract signed on May 29th 2009, it states that if Brand Makers in unable to
make payments, I will take possession and control of 100% of the equity in the
company. Brand Makers has not made a payment in 7 months so I am exercising
my right as outlined in the security agreement.
Archibald testified that in February 2010, Brand Makers, James Greaves and Archibald
agreed that Thomas Greaves could take over Brand Makers. Archibald further testified
that, pursuant to this agreement, he transferred his equity interest in Brand Makers to
Thomas Greaves (the Transfer). An "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of
Brand Makers Promotional Products, LLC," (Amended Operating Agreement) was
entered into, as of February 25, 2010 by Thomas Greaves as the sole member of Brand
Makers and James Greaves as Brand Makers manager. Other than the Amended
Operating Agreement there is nothing documenting the Transfer.

In re Archibald at 388. The trial court's finding that "In the Paint could have seized at least fifty
percent (50%) of Brand Maker's assets" is not supported by any evidence in the record and is
actually contrary to the facts. There is no accounting or even speculation in the record as to the
valuation of Brand Makers. To speculate that for a $90,000 debt 60 In the Paint could seize half
of Brand Maker's assets and "effectively effectuated a hostile takeover" of a company that had
borrowed $694,000 61 and one could assume had assets of around this amount or more is
absurd. Greaves testified that he knew there was no risk of In the Paint seizing 50% of Brand

s9

Id.
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Makers as Archibald did not own Brand Makers and because Archibald only owed them about
$90,000. 62
Finally, the record clearly shows that Archibald was the only party to the lawsuit for
which the attorney's fees were paid. 6 '
2.

The Trial Court's Finding of Fact That Brand Maker's Mistake Caused the Just For
Does Loss and That Brand Makers Failed to Comply With the Sales
Representation For Reconciliation Are Not Consistent With Evidence Presented
At Trial.

The trial court incorrectly states that "[d]ue to Brand Makers mistake, the Just for Does
account ultimately lost $16,451.02. 64 The trial court also incorrectly concluded that "Brand
Makers did not attempt to recover any of the bad debts from Just for Does." 65 Testimony at
trial shows that mistakes occasionally happened and that the company policy agreed upon by
the commissioned sales force was that even in the case of mistakes, the sales people split any
loss to the company. 66 Those same statements and the invoices introduced as evidence at trial
clearly show that Brand Makers repeatedly billed Just for Does in an attempt to recover the bad
debt. 67
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that Brand Makers did not comply with the
Sales Representation Agreement. 68 The Sales Representation Agreement stated in relevant part
that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 5, any commissions otherwise becoming
earned and due to Representative as of the expiration or termination date of this
62

TR Vol. Ip. 117 L. 22 - p. 118 L. 6.
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Agreement, or thereafter, may be withheld by Company and shall become due, if at all,
only after final reconciliation is performed by the Company One Hundred and Fifty (150)
days subsequent to the expiration or termination date (hereinafter "Reconciliation
Date"). 69
The trial court later in its Conclusions of Law held that "Brand Makers failed to conduct any
reconciliation with Archibald within 150 days of Archibald's departure in June 2013." 70
However, the evidence at trial consistently shows through exhibits and testimony that Brand
Makers through its business practices and records had reconciled all of Archibald's sales,
commissions, credits and debits_71 Importantly, the Complaint in this matter was filed on
September 27, 2013, a mere 99 days after the Severance Agreement was signed on June 20,
2013. The fact that the Complaint in this matter was filed 99 days after the Severance
Agreement was signed clearly shows that Brand Makers had completed a final reconciliation
and knew exactly what commissions, debits or debts remained owing. The evidence at trial also
shows that Brand Makers and Archibald repeatedly discussed this reconciliation and the parties
continued to seek payment of any commissions owed or debits owed to Brand Makers. 72 Even
the trial court's own findings of fact show reconciliation of the Just for Does account. 73
Perhaps the court was looking for a particular document or procedure titled "final
reconciliation" but that is not what the Sales Representation Agreement required. The plain
language of that document required only that commissions were to become due after a final
reconciliation "if at all." The agreement does not specifically require a final reconciliation and
definitely does not require the final reconciliation to take any particular form. Clearly, as

69
70
71
72

73

Trial Exhibit No. 25 at p. 126.
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evidence at trial showed, Brand Makers had completed a final reconciliation as it was able to
conclusively show through unrebutted business records that it knew exactly how much it had
paid Archibald, how many of his orders were outstanding and had been paid, and how much
Archibald owed. 74 This reconciliation was accomplished through regular business records and
conversations between the parties.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

l. Contract Enforcement is Strict and the Assumption That Archibald Did Not Breach
the Loan Agreement Because He Sought Clarification of the Amount Is Not a Valid
Legal Defense to the Breach of Contract.
Liability under a contract is strict and not determined by fault. See Classic Cheesecake
Company, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 839, 846 (7 th Cir 2008) ("Liability for

breach of contract is strict, rather than based (as tort liability generally is) on fault.") In fact,
"[l]iability for breach of contract is strict, which makes the performing party an insurer against
the consequences of his failing to perform, even if the failure is not his fault." Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 557 F.3d 504, 506 (7 th Cir 2009) citing The Restatement

(Second) of Contracts, introductory note to ch. 11, preceding Section 261. Additionally,
"courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more
equitable." Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223 (2009). "Equity may intervene to change the
terms of a contract if the court finds unconscionable conduct serious enough to justify its
interference." Id. "It is not sufficient, however, that the contractual provisions appear unwise
or their enforcement may seem harsh." Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 810,820 (2016).
The trial court found that "Plaintiff has established through testimony and Plaintiff's

74
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Exhibit No. 8 that there was an express contract between the parties in the form of the Loan
Agreement that Archibald would repay $51,986 of the attorney fees." The trial court also
found that some amount had not been paid on that contract. However, the court then held
that "Archibald has not committed a breach of contract because he has simply sought
clarification on how much he owed." The written contract did not contain any provision for
stopping payments until the loan was paid in full. The specific written terms of the agreement
stated that in 2012, the lender "will withhold from borrower's paycheck half of the amount
over $3,000 each pay period." In 2013 "the remaining balance of the loan will be paid in
monthly Payments of $3,000" and if "full payment isn't achieved in 2013, payments will
remain during 2014 and beyond until the balance is paid in full." 75
Archibald himself testified that he "owed between $14,000 and $19,000.00 to Brand
Makers for legal fees when I was forced out." 76 Additionally, Archibald repeatedly told Brand
Makers that he would "keep sending you payments as often as I am able and will continue to
make payments until the balance that I still owe from the In The Paint litigation is paid off." 77
Thus, Archibald clearly knew he owed some amount and he just stopped making payments.
There is clearly no term of the contract requiring any kind of statement from Brand Makers.
Archibald could have easily tracked the amount owed and the amount paid himself. Because
"[l]iability for breach of contract is strict, which makes the performing party an insurer against
the consequences of his failing to perform, even if the failure is not his fault" there can be no
defense of I needed clarification of the amount still owed. Although the court did hold that

75
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Archibald still owed money under the contract, the finding that Archibald did not commit a
breach of contract does not follow from the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, this Court
should reverse the finding of the trial court and hold that Archibald did breach the express
contract dated December 6, 2011.
2. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion That There Was No Implied In Fact Contract For
Repayment of Attorney's Fees Is Not Supported By The Evidence.
Both quantum meruit (implied-in-fact contracts) and unjust enrichment (implied-in-law
contracts) are "measures of equitable recovery." Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 232 (2012).
An implied-in-fact contract exists where there is no express agreement, but the
conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists.
We have held that "[a]n implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and
existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request
of one party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the
circumstances attending the performance." Therefore, we have stated the general rule
as follows: "where the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one
performed at the other's request and that the requesting party promised payment, then
the court may find a contract implied in fact."
Clayson at 233 (Internal citations omitted).

The trial court's conclusion that there was not an implied-in-fact contract between the
parties is not supported by the evidence in this case. The court incorrectly concluded that
because there was "no meeting of the minds to create an implied contract." 78 However, there
is no legal requirement for a meeting of the minds for an implied-in-fact contract to exist as is
evidenced by Zebe and the elements required for an implied-in-fact contract to exist. 79 If there
was a meeting of the minds, there would necessarily be an express contract and not an implied-

78

R Vol. I p. 604.
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See also Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 660 (Where there is no meeting of the minds recovery under
quantum meruit is an appropriate remedy).
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in-fact contract. The evidence in this case supports of finding that an implied-in-fact contract
did exist. Specifically, Brand Makers undisputedly conferred a benefit upon Archibald by paying
his attorney's fees in a case where Archibald was the only defendant. The attorney was clearly
defending Archibald and not Brand Makers as Brand Makers was not a party in the case.
Archibald ultimately prevailed in the case and as such he clearly appreciated the benefit of
Brand Makers paying his attorney to defend him. As each of the elements of an implied-in-fact
contract exists, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that an
implied-in-fact contract for Archibald to repay his attorney's fees paid by Brand Makers did
exist.
The trial court conclusion that "[e]ven if there were an implied in fact contract between
Archibald and Brand Makers for the payment of additional attorney fees and costs, there were
no damages to Brand Makers" because "Brand Makers benefited substantially from prevailing
in the lawsuit because it prevented In the Paint from effectuating a hostile takeover" does not
follow from the evidence produced, is pure unfounded speculation and simply incorrect. The
court in the In the Paint litigation went so far as to say it found the idea that Brand Makers had
transferred Archibald's equity to Thomas Greaves for any reason other than the fact that Brand
Makers owed Thomas Greaves a lot of money and was in default, "baffling." 80 In re Archibald,
482 B.R. 378, 401 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012). Thus giving further credence to the fact that Brand
Makers knew it was never in jeopardy of a hostile takeover.
3. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion That Unjust Enrichment Does Not Apply To Count
One of This Case Because There Was An Express Contract Between The Parties
Which Covered This Subject Matter Is Misplaced And Not Correct.

80
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Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be
inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is
unjust. A prim a facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there
was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the
plaintiff for the value thereof.

Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557-58 (2007)(Internal Citations omitted). The trial
court, in its conclusions of law, correctly cited the elements of unjust enrichment and further
cited correct law stating that "the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not permissible where there
is an enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same subject
matter."

81

However, the court's legal conclusion does not comport with the evidence of the

case. The court even contradicts its own findings as it states in paragraph 5 that "Plaintiff failed

to establish that there was an express contract between the parties that Archibald would
reimburse Brand Makers for any attorney fees incurred in excess of $51,986." 82 Then later in
paragraph 12 the court held that the "doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply to this
because there was an express contract between the parties which covered this subject
matter." 83 It cannot be both ways, either Brand Makers established an express contract for
payment of attorney's fees in excess of those covered by the written contract or it did not. If
the court's conclusion in paragraph 5 is correct that Brand Makers failed to establish an express
contract, then the doctrine of unjust enrichment would be applicable. Because the trial court
failed to analyze the facts with regard to unjust enrichment because it incorrectly stated there
was an express contract, there are no conclusions of law specific to the elements of unjust
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enrichment. However, the evidence in the record shows that there was a benefit conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff in the form of $68,037.50 paid to Archibald's attorney.
Again, it is obvious that the defendant appreciated the benefit as Archibald did not have to pay
the legal fees and he prevailed in his case. Finally, acceptance of Band Makers payments under
these circumstances would be inequitable for Archibald to retain without repayment to Brand
Makers. Brand Makers made these payments for Archibald's benefit with at least a belief that
Archibald would repay the Brand Makers if not assurances from Archibald that he would repay
the amounts. The evidence at trial clearly shows Band Makers believed or was told by
Archibald that he would repay the amounts but at trial Archibald presented a completely new
theory that Brand Makers was the party who benefited. 84 Archibald testified early on in these
proceedings that Brand Makers had lent him money for legal fees and that he "agreed to
pay." 8s Archibald also testified in this very same affidavit that he believed he only owed
between $14,000 and $19,000 more in attorney's fees to Brand Makers. 86 This Court should
find that because the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are inconsistent on the
existence of an express contract, there either existed an express contract for repayment of the
$68,037.50 which has not been paid, there existed an implied-in-fact contract to pay that
amount, or the doctrine of unjust enrichment should apply. Either way, this Court should find
that the trial court's conclusion of law that unjust enrichment does not apply is not supported
by the trial courts findings of fact or the evidence of the case.
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4. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion That Archibald Did Not Breach the Terms of the
Independent Sales Representative Agreement in Regard to the Just For Does
Account Does Not Comport With the Evidence of the Case.
The Independent Sales Representation Agreement stated at paragraph 5.5.2 that "[i]f
the Company does not receive full payment from accounts serviced by Representative, a debit
will be issued for the commissions allocable to the amount owed. The representative will be
responsible for the loss to the Company at his or her commission rate. The collection of all or
any portion of the indebtedness shall reduce, offset, or reverse the debt." 87 The trial court
apparently, from the evidence presented at trial, agreed with Brand Makers that it lost
$16,451.02 on the Just for Does account Archibald secured as a sales representative. 88
However, the trial court then improperly added terms to the written agreement finding that
the "orders occurred after Archibald departed from the company and Archibald had not fault
for Brand Makers' mistake." 89 This statement is factually incorrect as the orders were clearly
put in before Archibald departed the company as is evidenced from Archibald's own testimony
and the invoices introduced into evidence. 90 Additionally, James Greaves testified that many of
the orders were "fake" and that Archibald entered them into the system only to gain
commissions. 91 The trial court applied inapplicable law concluding that "[i]t is inequitable for
Brand Makers to collect from Archibald for their mistake." 92
However, as pointed out earlier in this brief, liability under a contract is strict and not
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determined by fault. See Classic Cheesecake Company, Inc. v. JP Morgon Chase Bank, N.A., 546
F.3d 839,846 (7 th Cir 2008). Additionally, "courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite
contracts in order to make them more equitable." Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223
(2009). "Equity may intervene to change the terms of a contract if the court finds
unconscionable conduct serious enough to justify its interference." Id. "It is not sufficient,
however, that the contractual provisions appear unwise or their enforcement may seem
harsh." Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 810, 820 (2016). The trial court in this case, never even
raised the issue of unconscionability and neither did Archibald in his defense. Because it was
clear and unambiguous in the contract that the "representative will be responsible for the loss
to the Company at his or her commission rate," the trial court abused its discretion and
incorrectly applied contract law finding that Archibald "had not fault."
Because the trial court did find that Brand Makers lost $16,451.02 due to Archibald's
servicing of the Just for Does account, this court should reverse the trial court's finding that
Archibald did not breach the contract and award Brand Makers damages at Archibald's
commission rate of 50%.
5. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion That Unjust Enrichment Does Not Apply To Count
Five of This Case Because There Was An Express Contract Between The Parties
Which Covered This Subject Matter Is Misplaced And Not Correct.
Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract
covering the same subject matter. The reason for this rule presently is that the remedies
for breach of an express contract, whether by law or by express agreement, afford
adequate relief. However, an express contract cannot provide adequate relief when it is
not enforceable. Thus, this Court has stated that "only when the express agreement is
found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract."
Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 643 (2011).
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Upon separation, Archibald and Brand Makers signed the Severance, Nonsolicitation
and Confidentiality Agreement on June 20, 2013. 93 That agreement stated that Archibald was
to receive $10,000 in severance pay. That agreement also stated that:
$10,000 will be a draw against commissions (in the system now). Anything more
(completed or in progress) than that will be applied to debt. After that, 50% of the
commission will go towards paying back debts. After debts are paid off, 50% of the
commission will go to Nate Archibald on these orders.
The trial court ultimately and correctly held that "Archibald received $2,571.15 more than he
ultimately earned in commissions." 94 However, the trial court then incorrectly held that "since
Brand Makers did not issue a final reconciliation as required by Article VI of Archibald's
Independent Sales Representation Agreement within 150 days of his termination, it cannot
issue any additional debits against Archibald's commission account. Because and express
agreement already covers this subject matter, unjust enrichment cannot apply. 95 However, the
trial court in this case held that "[a]s written, every provision of the non-compete agreement is
unreasonable and unenforceable." 96 Because the trial court held that the "every provision" or
in other words the entire document is unenforceable, there is no express agreement that
covers this subject and unjust enrichment should apply. Because the trial court ultimately
found that "Archibald received $2,571.15 more than he ultimately earned in commissions," he
has as a matter of fact been unjustly enriched. Archibald clearly received a benefit of $2,571.15
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from Brand Makers, appreciated the overpayment, and it would be unjust for him to retain that
benefit.
Alternatively, if this Court is to find that the Severance, Nonsolicitation and
Confidentiality Agreement signed on June 20, 2013 is enforceable, then an express contract
exists and this Court should find that Archibald has breached that agreement and owes Brand
Makers $2,571.15 in damages.
6. The Trial Court's Legal Conclusion That Each Provision of the Non-Compete is
Unreasonable and Unenforceable is Conclusory and Not Supported By Any Evidence
in the Record.
The trial court incorrectly held that "[b]ecause each provision of the non-compete
agreement is unreasonable and no evidence was put on as to what a reasonable geographical
restriction would look like, the Court cannot limit or modify it to make it enforceable." 97 The
trial court was correct when it stated that if the court "finds a term of the agreement
unreasonable, it shall limit or modify the agreement to reflect the intent of the parties and
render it reasonable and enforceable." 98 I.C. § 44-2703 says exactly that adding that the court
shall "specifically enforce the agreement or covenant as limited or modified." The only
evidence in the record to establish that the agreement might be unreasonable is that, as the
trial court pointed out, the agreement was for a period of two years and I.C. § 44-2704
specifically limits such agreements to eighteen (18) months unless consideration or
employment is given.
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However, the trial court completely ignored Idaho law and the fact that I.C. §44-2704
specifically states in relevant part:
(3) It shall be a rebuttab/e presumption that an agreement or covenant is reasonable

as to geographic area if it is restricted to the geographic areas in which the key
employee or key independent contractor provided services or had a significant presence
or influence.
(4) It shall be a rebuttable presumption that an agreement or covenant is reasonable
as to type of employment or line of business if it is limited to the type of employment
or line of business conducted by the key employee or key independent contractor while
working for the employer.
(5) It shall be a rebuttable presumption that an employee or independent contractor
who is among the highest paid five percent (5%) of the employer's employees or
independent contractors is a "key employee" or a "key independent contractor." To
rebut such presumption, an employee or independent contractor must show that it has
no ability to adversely affect the employer's legitimate business interests.

(6) If a court finds that a key employee or key independent contractor is in breach of
an agreement or a covenant, a rebuttab/e presumption of irreparable harm has been
established. To rebut such presumption, the key employee or key independent
contractor must show that the key employee or key independent contractor has no
ability to adversely affect the employer's legitimate business interests.
Each of these Idaho statutes specifically creates a rebuttable presumption that the agreement
is reasonable as to geographic area and type of employment or line of business conducted by
the employee. Because it is presumed according to law that the contract was reasonable, it
was Archibald who had the burden of rebutting the reasonableness of the contract by showing
that he "has no ability to adversely affect the employer's legitimate business interests.
Because the trial court erred by not apply correct Idaho law to the agreement and
summarily held the entire agreement unenforceable because Brand Makers did not put on
evidence to show it was reasonable rather than requiring Archibald to rebut the presumption
that it was enforceable, this Court should reverse the decision of the Court and remand this
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issue for a determination of damages incurred within 18 months of Archibald and Brand Makers
separating. The agreement was very specific that upon violation, Brand Makers "shall be
entitled" to repayment of all compensation Archibald received as a result of the violation.
Uncontroverted evidence was presented on trial showing that Archibald had in fact violated the
agreement within the 18 month period. 99 There is even the potential that a 24 month period
was appropriate as it is undisputed that Brand Makers did provide consideration of a $10,000
severance but the trial court made not findings of fact on this issue. Additionally, Archibald has
testified on record that he made $22,159.82 from a company called IPROMOTEU during the
time the non-compete was effective. 100
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING BRAND MAKER'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO NATHAN LOYD ARCHIBALD.
The determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. When
examining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether
the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of that discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and
(3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Oakes v. Baise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 542-43 (2012)(Internal citations

omitted). Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover on an open
account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the
purchase of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise prohibited by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fee to be
set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A)
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states that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party." Rule 54(d)(l)(B)
states in relevant part that "[i]n determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties."
This Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals has in multiple cases determined that in a
case without counterclaims, such as is the situation in this case, a plaintiff who prevails on only
one of multiple claims or a plaintiff who only recovers a fraction of the overall amount sought,
is the prevailing party and can be awarded attorney fees. See Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112
Idaho 386 (Ct. App. 1987) (Although plaintiffs received only five percent of what they originally
sought, trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that they were prevailing party);
Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 542 (2012} (The Idaho Supreme

Court found the lower court had abused its discretion by not finding plaintiff to be the
prevailing party although plaintiff only recovered $2,043.92, "a fraction of the amount he
sought," $32,794.10.) Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187 (Ct. App. 2008) (Upholding a determination
that the plaintiff was the prevailing party although plaintiff had only prevailed on one of
multiple claims against the defendant.) This Court has agreed that "[m]ere dismissal of a claim
without trial does not necessarily mean that the party against whom the claim was made is a
prevailing party for the purpose of awarding costs and fees." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719 (2005). Commenting only on cases which involved

counterclaims, this Court has held:
"In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the
action.' That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an
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overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C., v. Nard
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130,133 (2005). This Court has
held that when both parties are partially successful, it is within the district court's
discretion to decline an award of attorney fees to either side. Israel v. Leachman, 139
Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864,867 (2003)."
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538 (2010)(Emphasis added).
The trial court in this matter erroneously found that Archibald was the prevailing party
finding that Archibald "successfully avoided liability on the majority of Plaintiff's claims" and
that Archibald "did not incur any liability beyond what Defendant was already expecting to
pay." 101 In the trial court's Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees, the trial court commented
that Brand Makers "all but one of the legal theories behind its claims" and that on the unjust
enrichment claim that Brand Maker's prevailed on, Archibald "did not contest" that Brand
Makers "was unjustly enriched. However, Archibald never conceded unjust enrichment and
Brand Maker's had to pursue this claim through trial. Additionally, based upon Brand Maker's
arguments contained earlier in this brief, Brand Makers believes it has actually prevailed on
more than the one claim the trial court considered Brand Makers to have prevailed on.
Additionally, Count Four of Brand Makers Amended Complaint which Brand Makers withdrew
at trial was paid only after the Amended Complaint had been filed through an ancillary criminal
case filed in Fremont County, Idaho case number CR-2015-658_10 2
The trial court incorrectly decided Brand Makers had only succeeded on one count,
where Brand Maker's was found to owe $2,500 on Count Three but was also found to be
entitled to $3,276 in Count One (although somehow found there was not breach just money

101

102

Augmented R Vol. I p. 12.
R Vol. I p. 661; See also TR Vol. I p. 77 L. 13 - p. 80 L. 4.
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still owing) and completely disregarded the fact that Brand Maker's recovered $1,727.60 which
was only paid after Brand Makers filed the Amended Complaint. However, even assuming the
trial court was correct and Brand Makers does not prevail on appeal on any of the above
explained matters, Brand Makers, pursuant to Idaho law should still be found to be the
prevailing party in the underlying matter.
Although the trial court in this matter correctly perceived this issue to be a matter of
discretion, the trial court failed to apply the proper applicable legal standards and thus abused
its discretion. The trial court only focused on one case and one factor in making its
determination. Specifically, the trial court cited to Eighteen Mile Ranch for the position that
"avoidance of liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a
plaintiff." 103 Importantly, in Eighteen Mile Ranch as well as in Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic
Physicians, PLLC, the prevailing parties recovered some amount either on a claim found in the

complaint or on a counterclaim. In this case, there were no counterclaims involved and Brand
Makers ultimately recovered a monetary judgment against Archibald for $5,776.00.
Brand Makers has not found any case for the position that a party that defends against
the majority of the issues but is still found liable on some issues and against whom a money
judgment is ultimately entered may be the prevailing party and the trial court has not cited to
any law supporting this position. There have been cases where this Court has held both parties
were partially successful and declined attorney's fees to either side, but never a case where the
only party receiving a money judgment against it was the prevailing party. See Israel v.
Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27 (2003) and Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho

103
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844, 847-48 (2007). Simply finding that attorney's fees may be awarded to a party who
receives an money judgment against it because the other party only prevailed on a portion of
the amount sought would lead to absurd results in all types of cases just as it has done in this
case.
Because there were no counterclaims involved in this case and because Brand Makers
ultimately recovered a judgment against Archibald for $5,776.00 this Court should find that the
trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and has abused its discretion in finding Archibald
to be the prevailing party. Additionally, should Brand Makers prevail on any of the other issues
contained in this appeal, the result of attorney's fees being awarded against it is even more
egregious. At a minimum this Court could find that because both parties prevailed in part, no
attorney's fees should be awarded as it found in Israel and Trilogy Network Systems, Inc.
IV.
BRAND MAKER'S IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL
Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permits the award of costs to the prevailing party
on appeal. Rule 40 states, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing party on appeal,
Brand Makers is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Rule 40. Similarly, Rule 41 provides for
an award of attorney's fees. A prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney's fees on
appeal if that prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees before the lower court. Action
Collection Servs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286 (Ct. App. 2008).
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) states that "[i]n any civil action to recover on ... any
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court .... " "The mandatory attorney
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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fee provisions of I.C. § 12-120 govern on appeal as well as in the trial court." Actions
brought for breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions,
subject to the attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-120(3).
Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 546-47 (2012).

In this case, Brand Makers was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3) before
the trial court because this matter was filed as a civil action to recover on an open account,
account stated, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of services within the meaning of
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and an employment contract which is a commercial transaction. 104
Because Brand Makers was entitled to fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) before the Magistrate
Court, Brand Makers is also entitled to its appellate attorney's fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41.

V.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this Brief, Brand Makers respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entry of Judgment
on Appeal finding:
1. The evidence presented at trial does not support the trial court's findings of fact;

2. The trial court's conclusions of law do not follow the findings of fact;
3. The trial court committed reversible error in denying Brand Maker's attorney's fees
and awarding attorney's fees to Archibald; and
4.

104

Brand Makers is entitled fees and costs below and before this Court.
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The below described is SIGNED.

Dated, Septembe, 27, 2 0 1 2 J - > ~ ~
R. KIMBALL MOSIER
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED ST ATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
In re:
Bankruptcy Number: l 0-31764
Nathan Lloyd Archibald.
Chapter 7
Debtor.

In the Paint. LLC. a Utah Limited
Liability Company and Collins. Inc., a
Utah Corporation.

Adversary Proceeding No. l 0-03057
Judge R. Kimball Mosier

Plaintiffs.
V.

Nathan Lloyd Archibald,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

This is an adversary proceeding brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and
1

§ 727(a)(2) & (5) by In the Paint, LLC. and Collins. lnc.(collectively Plaintiffs) against Nathan

'Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory references arc to Title 1 I of the United
States Code.
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Lloyd Archibald (Defendant or Archibald). The trial in this matter began on June 25. 2012 and
continued on June 26. 2012 and June 28, 2012. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' presentation
of evidence. the Defendant filed a "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Plaintiffs' 523(a)
. Claim." That motion was followed by the Defendant's oral motion seeking judgment in the
Defendant's favor on the § 727 claim. The COUI1 permitted the Defendant until July 2. 20012 to
file additional briefing addressing both the§ 523 and § 727 issues and pe1mitted Plaintiffs until
July 6, 2012 to file a reply brief. Both parties timely briefed the merits of their arguments. and
the Court heard oral arguments on July 9, 2012. The Comi has carefully reviewed the pleadings,
the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel.
The Court views the Defendant's motion as a motion for judgment on partial findings as
provided under Federal Rule of Evidence 52(c) made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7052(c) and dismissal under Federal Rule of Evidence 41.' When a court is presented
with a Rule 52( c) motion. the court must undertake the fact finding process which involves a
weighing of the evidence and an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses to determine
whether or not the plaintiff has demonstrated a factual and legal right to relief' "In a ease tried
without a jury. the trial com1 is not required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff in detc1mining whether to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 made at the
completion of the plaintiffs casc.''4 After considering the evidence. including facts as stipulated

'Sec Woods v. North American Rockwell Corporation, 480 F.2d 644. 645-46 (10th Cir.
1973).
1

Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296,299 & n. 4 (10th Cir.). cert. denied,
484 U.S. 954 (1987).
4

Woods v. North American Rockwell C01poration, at 645-46.
2
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to or admitted by the parties. or as adduced from testimony of various witnesses. or as
established by the introduction of exhibits. and after assessing the credibility of the witnesses.
and considering the arguments of counseL and conducting an independent review of the law. the
Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
In the Paint. LLC (ITP) was engaged in the promotional products industry (the Promo
Indnstry). Its business involved the sale and production of promotional products. At all relevant
times. Sean Collins (Collins) has been the majority owner of ITP.
Jason Marsh (Marsh) first became associated with ITP as a salesman and sometime prior
to December of 2006 became a 25% owner and presidem of!TP. In late December 2006. at a
lunch meeting (Lunch Meeting). Marsh informed Collins that he intended to leave ITP. During
the Lunch Meeting. Marsh and Collins began discussing various alternatives for an agreed
resolution of issues related to Marsh's decision to leave ITP. Marsh informed Collins that if
Marsh continued working in the Promo Industry. his business would be named Prodigy Promos
(Prodigy). Marsh had registered the domain name PRODIGYPROMOS.COM in 2004 and
Marsh and his wife Jill had organized Prodigy and registered "Prodigy Promos L.C.'' with the
Utah Department of Commerce on November 30. 2006.
Archibald was hired by Marsh to work as a salesperson for !TP and was employed by
ITP until January 2007. During his employment. Archibald's employment contract prohibited
Archibald from (a) working in or for a competitor of ITP in the Promo Industry, and (b)
soliciting business from ITP's customers (collectively. the Noncompetition Obligations).

3
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In December of 2006. Archibald solicited orders on behalf of Prodigy from at least two
JTP customers (the Two Orders), those being Sun Edison and the American Red Cross. On
December 13. 2006, Archibald originated Prodigy purchase order no. 803 for Sun Edison in the
amount of$3.039.74. and on December !3, 2006. Archibald obtained an order for the American
Red Cross as evidenced by Prodigy Invoice No. 505 in the amount of$2.736. l 2. Archibald did
not disclose to JTP that he had taken the purchase orders from Sun Edison or the American Red
Cross for the benefit of Prodigy.
In early January 2007. but prior to January 23, 2007. the controller of ITP discovered a
document' pe11aining to Prodigy (the Prodigy Incident). The document revealed that Prodigy
had been conducting activity prior to that date and probably prior to the Lunch Meeting. The day
the ITP controller discovered the Prodigy document, or the following day, Archibald and other
employees of ITP were escmied out of the JTP offices. Collins and Marsh met after the Prodigy
Incident (Follow-up Meeting). At the Follow-up Meeting, Marsh provided Collins with
additional. albeit incomplete. inf01mation about Prodigy. After the Follow-up Meeting, either
later that day or the following day. Archibald was permitted to reenter the ITP offices.
In January 2007. as the agreed resolution to Marsh· s decision to leave ITP. Plaintiffs and
Marsh negotiated a separation agreement (Marsh Separation Agreement). The Marsh Separntion
Agreement terminated Marsh· s employment with fTP, terminated Marsh's noncompetition
agreement and tbe noncompetition agreements of several other individuals. The Marsh
Separation Agreement included a provision that expressly terminated Archibald's

5

Marsh testified that the controller discovered something, he thought it was "the articles
of incorporation or something. or domain name, or something."

4
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Noncompetition Obligations. The Marsh Separation Agreement also transferred certain !TP
customer accounts to Prodigy and Marsh in exchange for payments set forth in the Marsh
Separation Agreement. Marsh's Separation Agreement was signed on January 23. 2007. but
back-dated to January 10. 2007. One explanation offered. by Collins. for making the agreement
effective January 10, 2007. was that on or around January l 0, 2007. !TP began taking orders to
produce promotional products for Prodigy.
The Marsh Separation Agreement also rescinded Marsh's January l 0. 2007 resignation
and withdrawal and provided that "[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary in that certain
operating agreement dated August I. 2002 between [Marsh] and Collins ... [lTP] shall not
dissolve upon the redemption of [Marsh's] right...." The evidence related to this provision was
limited and vague. The August 1, 2002 operating agreement was not introduced into evidence.
After Plaintiffs had entered into the Marsh Separation Agreement, Collins met with
Archibald to execute Archibald's separation agreement (Separation Agreement). The Separation
Agreement released Archibald from his Noncompetition Obligations (Release) and transferred
certain !TP customer accounts. set forth on an ''EXHIBIT

x-- (X-List). to Archibald.

The

Separation Agreement also had an ·'EXHIBIT Y" (Y-List) which were accounts retained by !TP.
Other than the X-List and Y-List, the Separation Agreement had already been drafted entirely by
ITP. Other than the X-List and Y-List, there were no negotiations between Archibald and
Plaintiffs concerning the terms of the Separation Agreement.
The Separation Agreement at paragraph 6.( c) states, in paii:
(c) Prior to execution of this Agreement. the
company has been given a reasonable opportunity
to review all relevant books. records and
documents, have been supplied with all additional
information that the Company have requested, have

5
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had a reasonable opportunity to ask questions of
and receive answers from Archibald and all such
questions have been answered to the Cornpany·s
full satisfaction. Furthermore. in making the
decision to sell the Archibald Accounts t[ o] and
enter into this Agreement, the Company has not
relied upon any representations written or oral. from
Archibald, but has relied on its own investigation of
the Company" s business and affairs and
independent advice from its legal counsel and
financial advisors.

When Archibald and Collins met to sign the Separation Agreement. Collins did not ask
Archibald if he had ever acted on behalf of Prodigy or if Archibald had violated his
Noncompetition Obligations. Collins did not tell Archibald. or otherwise communicated to him.
that any failure to honor his Noncompetition Obligations was material to Plaintiffs' decision to
enter into the Separation Agreement.
When Archibald and Collins met to sign the Separation Agreement. Archibald did not
disclose to Collins that he had solicited the Two Orders on behalf of Prodigy or that he had ever
violated his Noncompetition Obligations. Archibald testified that when he met wiih Collins to
sign the Separation Agreement he believed, because of the Prodigy Incident and discussions with
Marsh. that Collins was already aware of his involvement with Prodigy and his potential
violations of the Noncompetition Obligations.
As part of the consideration for entering into the Separation Agreement, Archibald
agreed to pay ITP $90.000 as evidenced by a promissory note (S90.000 Promissory Note).
Paragraph l .(h) of the Separation agreement also provided that Archibald would make himself
available to train ITP personnel. Collins testified that "we were losing our entire sales force",
and Archibald was agreeing to make himself available to train new salesmen for ITP.

6
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Over the following 18 month period. Archibald made at least 1 l payments of S l .000 each
lo ITP and negotiated a $5.000 credit to be applied toward the $90,000 Promissory Note in
conjunction with the resolution of a dispute over one of the X-List customer accounts. Archibald
testified that he ceased making payments to lTP on the $90.000 Promissory Note because of
Archibald" s belief that ITP had violated the Separation Agreement by soliciting one or more of
the X-List customers. In addition. Archibald testified that at the time he ceased making
payments to lTP on the $90.000 Promissory Note. Archibald was experiencing financial
hardships.
Collins testified that Plaintiffs would not have entered into the Separation Agreement
with Archihald if they had known that Archibald had violated his Noncompetition Obligations.
Prior to January 2007, ITP had terminated at least one employee for violation of his
noncompetition obligations. In 2005 or 2006, Roh Rowan (Rowan), a fo1mer sales
representative and ITP worked out an aITangement (Rowan Agreement) similar to the Separation
Agreement. Rowan had violated his noncompetition agreement with ITP and the Rowan
Agreement permitted Rowan to continue his competitive activities notwithstanding Rowan ·s
violation of the his noncompetition obligations.
After terminating his employment with ITP, Archibald began working for Prodigy as a
sales representative. ln October 2008, Archibald left Prodigy and began working as a co-owner
of a company founded by James Greaves and Archibald called Brand Makers Promotional
Products. LLC (Brand Makers). When Brand Makers was organized, James Greaves and
Archibald each owned a fifty percent interest.
From its inception, Brand Makers suffered substantial operating losses. To offset the
operating losses, Brand Makers borrowed money from Thomas Greaves who is the father of
7
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James Greaves. Prior to May 2009, Thomas Greaves loaned Brand Makers a total of
approximately $206,000. In May of 2009. Thomas Greaves refused to lend additional funds to
Brand Makers without first obtaining a promissory note, security agreement and personal
guarantees from James Greaves and Archibald. On May 29, 2009, Brand Makers entered into a
promissory note in the amount of$250,000 and security agreement in favor of Thomas Greaves
(May 2009 Agreement). James Greaves and Archibald both signed the May 2009 Agreement as
guarantors. There was no written security agreement between Archibald and Thomas Greaves.
In conjunction with the May 2009 Agreement Thomas Greaves advanced an additional $40.758
to Brand Makers.

In August of 2009, Brand Makers entered into a promissory note in the amount of
$150,000 and security agreement in favor of Thomas Greaves (August 2009 Agreement). James
Greaves and Archibald both signed the August 2009 Agreement as guarantors. After May

or

2009, Thomas Greaves lent Brand Makers approximately $225,000 in additional funds. By
February 2010, Thomas Greaves had lent Brand Makers a total of approximately $4 71 .000.
Brand Makers failed to make scheduled payments to Thomas Greaves and was in default
as of September 2009. On February 24, 2010, Thomas Greaves sent an e-mail (February 2010
E-mail) addressed to James Greaves which stated:
l am writing this email to formalize what we have already
discussed. In our contract signed on May 29th 2009, it states that
if Brand Makers in unable to make payments, 1 will take
possession and control of 100% of the equity in the company.
Brand Makers has not made a payment in 7 months so I am
exercising my right as outlined in the security agreement.
Archibald testified that in February 2010, Brand Makers, James Greaves and Archibald agreed
that Thomas Greaves could take over Brand Makers. Archibald further testified that, pursuant to

8
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this agreement, he transferred his equity interest in Brand Makers to Thomas Greaves (tbe
Transfer). An ··Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Brand Makers Promotional
Products. LLc:· (Amended Operating Agreement) was entered into. as of February 25. 20 IO by
Thomas Greaves as the sole member of Brand Makers and James Greaves as Brand Makers
manager. Other than the Amended Operating Agreement there is nothing documenting the
Transfer.
After February 2010. Archibald ceased taking ownership draws from the Brand Makers
account, but was paid commissions. After February 24. 20 I 0. Archibald continued to be
associated with Brand Makers. He managed Brand Makers' day-to day operations. participated
in employment decisions, signed checks, assisted in payment of bills and trained sales people.
Archibald is currently a sales person for Brand Makers.
On May 7. 201 0, the Fourth District Court, State of Utah entered a judgment in case no.
080402971, in favor of!TP and against Archibald in the amount of $108,983.07. After !TP
ohtained its judgment against Archibald. hut before Archibald filed for bankruptcy on August
27. 2010, Archibald and James Greaves met with Collins to discuss the Judgment (.Judgment
Meeting). Collins testified, that at this meeting, it was represented to him that Archibald was
still an owner of Brand Makers and that Brand Makers owed Thomas Greaves a large sum of
money.

ln response to question number IO in Archibald's Statement of Financial Affairs filed in
his bankruptcy proceeding case no. 10-31764. Archibald disclosed

,t transfer to Tom Greaves.

The transfer was described as "50% interest in Brand Makers, LLC. repossessed on secured
claims for$ loaned to company ...

9
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DISCUSSION
This adversary proceeding is hrought by the Plaintiffs under§§ 523(a)(2)(A) and
727(a)(2) & (5). Under both sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a creditor seeking
exception to discharge or denial of discharge must show. by a preponderance of the evidence.
that they are entitled to the relief sough!." Exceptions to discharge under § 523 are to be
narrowly construed. and because of the fresh start objectives ofhankruptcy, doubt is to be
resolved in the debtor's favor. 7 Grounds for denying a discharge under§ 727 are to he naiTOwly
construed.'

A.

Plaintiff's Section 523(a)(2)(A) Claim.
To establish that a debt is excepted from discharge under§ 523(a)(2)(A). ·· ... a creditor

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence". the following elements:

( I ) the debtor made a false representation:
(2) the debtor made the representation with the intent to deceive the creditor:
(3) the creditor relied on the representation;
(4) the creditor's reliance was [justified]: and
(5) the debtor's representation caused the creditor to sustain a loss.•· 10

6

Grogan 1·. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,291 (1991} (with respect to§ 523), and In re Serafini,
938F.2d 1156.1157(10thCir.199l)(withrespectto§ 727).
7

1n re Kaspar. 125 F.3d 1358, [361 (10th Cir. 1997).

8

111 re Kallstrom, 298 B.R. 753, 758 (I 0th Cir. BAP 2003).

9

Sec Grogan,·. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279, 291(199[).

10

/n re Young, 91 F.3d 1367, 1373 (I 0th Cir. I 996). As discussed, infi'a, the Supreme
Court has clarified that the proper standard is "justifiable reliance."
10
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A failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal to the creditor's claim. Based on the
Factual Findings set f01ih above. the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish any
of the requisite§ 523ia)(2)(A) elements.

l. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish a False Representation. The Plaintiffs·
§ 523(a)(2)(A) action is based upon the assertion that Archibald failed to disclose the fact that he
had violated his Noncompetition Obligations by soliciting the Two Orders," and if Archibald
had disclosed this fact, Plaintiffs would not have entered into the Separation Agreement. Failure
to disclose information may constitute a false representation or false pretenses under
§ 523(a)(2)(A)"

When detennining exceptions to discharge under ij 523(a)(2)(A). bankruptcy courts look
to the concept of actual fraud as it was understood in 1978. '' "Then. as now, the most widely
accepted distillation of the common law of torts was Restatement (Second) of Torts ( 1976). ·• 1·1
(Restatement). Restatement (Second) ofT01is (1976) (Restatement)§ 551 addresses liability for
nondisclosure. The applicable portion of§ 551 15 states -

§ 551 Liability for Nondisclosure

''Plaintiffs also alleged that Archibald had no intention of paying his debt under the
Separation Agreement at the time he signed it, but failed to introduce any significant evidence
with respect to this allegation.

croung at 1374.
1

'Fieldv. Manns. 516 U.S. 59, 70 (1995).

"Id.
15

Restatemen1 § 551(2)(b),(c) and (d) are not applicable. Clause (b) applies when a
partial or ambiguous statement give rise to a duty while clauses (c) and (d) apply when
subsequently acquired information creates a duty to disclose.
11
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(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability
to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed
to disclose. if: but only if. he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to
disclose the matter in question.

(2) One pm1y to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated.
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trnst and confidence between them; and

(e) facts basic to the transaction. ifhe knows that the other is about to enter into it
under a mistake as to them. and that the otber. because of the relationship between them.
the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of those facts.
(emphasis added). lfthere is no duty of disclosure there is no liability for nondisclosure."' A
person under a duty to disclose "'is required to disclose only those matters that he knows will be
regarded by the other as important in determining his course of action in the transaction at
hand.'" 17
Analysis of a claim for nondisclosure is essentially a two step analysis. First, was there a
duty to disclose. and second. if there was a duty to disclose. did the nondisclosing party fail to
disclose a fact that he knew may justifiably induce the other party to act with respect to the
transaction to be consummated.

a. Archibald's duty to disclose.
While the Restatement provides a distillation of the common law relating to the duty to
disclose, as the Utah Supreme Court has noted,

16

Restatement § 5 51 cmt. a (197 6).

17

Id. cmt. c (emphasis added).
12
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... except in broad tenns the law does not attempt to define the occasions when a
duty to speak arises. On the contrary. there has been adopted. as a leading
principle. the proposition that whether a duty to speak exists is determinable
by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by comparing the facts
not disclosed with the object and end in view by the contracting parties. The
difficulty is not so much in stating the general principles oflaw. which are pretty
well understood. as in applying the law to paiticular groups of facts."
The Court must look at the totality of the circumstances of this case and compare the facts not
disclosed with the object and end in view by Plaintiffs and Archibald to determine whether there
was a duty to disclose.
The evidence shows that the Separation Agreement was only one of several similar
agreements entered into between Plaintiffs and TTP salesmen. most notably Marsh, in an effmt to
minimize the economic impact !TP was facing from the loss of its sales force. Collins was put
on inquiry notice of the possibility that some. or all. of the ITP salesmen were involved with. and
had performed work for. Prodigy prior to January 23. 2007. Collins was put on notice at the
Luncheon Meeting that Prodigy was an entity that would be affiliated with Marsh. Collins was
further put on inquiry notice regarding possible violations of noncompetition obligations by ITP
salesmen as a result of the Prodigy Incident and the Follow-Up Meeting with Marsh. Collins
was put on actual notice that Prodigy was in existence prior to signing the Sepai·ation
Agreement. 19 Plaintiffs knew of Prodigy's activities because ITP agreed to perform contract
services beginning January l O. 2007 for orders Prodigy had already solicited. Notwithstanding
this knowledge. Plaintiffs did not seek to enforce any noncompetition agreements but elected to
enter into separation agreements releasing the salesmen from liability.

"Elder v. Clawson. 384 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1963) (emphasis added).
''The Marsh Sepai·ation Agreement, which was signed prior to the Separation Agreement.
clearly identifies Prodigy as a party to the agreement.
13
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Enforcement of the noncompetition agreements would have resulted in the loss oflTP
salesmen. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that enforcing the noncompetition agreements.
particularly Archibald's. would have resulted in any benefit or recovery of any damages that
may have resulted from the salesmen· s violation of their non competition agreements. Because
the separation agreements provided for the sale of customer accounts and the promise of future
production work the separation agreements provided an economic benefit to lTP. Plaintiffs·
election to enter into the separation agreements makes economic sense. Their choices were to
enforce the noncompetition agreements. which would mean possible elimination of!TP's sales
force and recovery of little if any damages. or enter into new agreements that provided more
economic benefit by receiving value for the accounts sold and the promise of business revenue
from future production orders. The inference the Court draws from this evidence is that the
object and end in view of Plaintiffs and Archibald was not the enforcement of the
Noncompetition Obligations but was rather the termination of the Noncompetition Obligations.
the sale of customer accounts to Archibald and Archibald's agreement to have ITP perform his
production work.
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a duty to disclose under Restatement § 551 (2)( a).
Plaintiffs argue that Archibald's employment contract containing the Noncompetition
Obligations established a relationship of trust and confidence, forged over a period of years.
Although not expressly stated. Plaintiffs seem to assert that this relationship of trust and

14
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confidence created a fiduciary relation"' and therefore gives rise to a duty to disclose." Plaintiffs
argue that because Archibald was bound by an employment agreement containing the
Noncompetition Obligations, "Archibald had a duty to ITP to , exercise the utmost good faith,
loyalty, and honesty toward [ITP]. to act solely for the benefit of the [sic] [ITP] in all matters
connected with the relationship, and to refrain from any self-dealing transactions which had the
potential to benefit the [sic] Archibald at the expense of!TP.'"
Plaintiffs did not introduce any written employment or noncompetition agreement into
evidence so the court can only rely on the testimony heard at trial. The testimony is that
Archibald was a salesman for ITP. For purposes of its analysis, the Conn will assume that. as a
salesman, Archibald acted as an agent for ITP and had a duty to disclose information relevant to
the matter entrusted to him. namely sales. The court will also assume that Archibald's
solicitation of ITP customers for another entity is info1mation relevant to the matter entrusted to
him and he had a duty under his empioyment agreement to disclose the Two Orders.
But. the issue before the Court is not Archibald's employment agreement and alleged
breach of bis duty as a salesman/agent for ITP. but rather it is the Separation Agreement and
matters relating to the negotiation of the Separation Agreement. Was Archibald negotiating in a
fiduciary relation with respect to the Separation Agreement? The answer is no. ·'Such a
confidential relationship' may be found where '(l) one party has taken steps to induce another to
believe that it can safely rely on the first party's judgment or advice; (2) one party has gained the

wThe court is not analyzing fiduciary relationship under t 523(a)(4 ). which pursuant to
Fowler Brothers v. Young (In re Young). 91 F.3d 1367, 1371 (I 0th Cir. 1996) requires an express
or technical trust to establish a fiduciary relationship.
"Restatement~ 551(2)(a).
15
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confidence of the other and purports io act or advise with the other"s interest in mind: or (3) the
parties· relationship is such that one is induced to relax the care and vigilance that ordinarily
would be exercised in dealing with a stranger. '" 22
Without any additional factual basis. Plaintiffs seek to extend any duty Archibald may
have had as a salesman/agent to his negotiation of the Separation Agreement. Plaintiffs
introduced no evidence to show that Archibald had taken any steps to induce Plaintiffs to believe
that they could rely on his advice with respect to the Separation Agreement, that he was acting or
advising them with their interests in mind. or that he induced them to relax the care and vigilance
that they would n01mally exercise. In fact. paragraph 6.(c) of the Separation Agreement
disavows that Archibald was looking after Plaintiffs interests or inducing them to relax their
vigilance. ·'[O]ne may not abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and

unilaterallr impose a fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious assumption of such
duties by the one sought to be held liable as a fiduciary.''' 3 In light of Archibald's suspected
involvement with Prodigy, Plaintiffs express waiver of any reliance on Archibald·s
representations and their assumption of the risk of investigation of facts. Plaintiffs can no! no\\
unilaterally impose a fiduciary duty on Archibald.
Plaintiffs have also failed to establish a duty to disclose under Restatement § 55 l (2)( e ).
The Comment on Clause (e) in Restatement§ 551 states A basic fact is a fact that is assumed by the parties as a basis for the transaction
itself. It is a fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the transaction, and is an

"Ryan v. Blatzer 438 B.R. al *5 (IO Cir. BAP 2010) (table decision).

"Denison Suue Bank, .. Madoria. 640 P.2d 1235. 1243-44 (Kan. 1982) (emphasis added),
LNS lnvcstmelll Company. Inc. T'. Phillips 66 Co., W.L No. 87-2215-0, 1989 WL 10367, at *4
(D. Kan. August 29. l 989) (quotation omitted).
16
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important part of the substance of what is bargained for or dealt with. Other facts
may serve as important and persuasive inducements to enter into the transaction.
but not go to its essence. These facts may be material, but they are not basic.
If the parties expressly or impliedly place the risk as to the existence of a fact
on one party· or if the law places the risk as to the existence of a fact on one party
or if the law places it here by custom of otherwise the other party has no duty of
disclosure. (Compare Restatement. Second Contracts§ 296)."

Plaintiffs cannot rely on Restatement § 551(2)( e) for two reasons. First and foremost pursuant to
paragraph 6.( c) of the Separation Agreement, Plaintiffs expressly placed the risk as to the
existence of facts on themselves. Restatement§ 55](2)(e) would not excuse any
misrepresentations made by Archibald in response to questions. but he had no duty to disclose
because Plaintiffs assumed the risk as to the existence of facts.
Secondly. Archibald·s adherence to his Noncompetition Obligations was not a basic. as
opposed to material, fact that went to the essence of the Separation Agreement. The Comment on
Clause (e) clarifies that facts may be materiaL but not be basic. Materiality clearly relates to
liability for nondisclosure" but it does not create a duty to disclose.
Tbe Separation Agreement contains two recitals which reveal the essence of the
Separation Agreement. The Recitals in the Separation agreement state: "A. Archibald·s
employment with the Company has been Terminated. B. Archibald desires to obtain certain
rights with respect to certain customers of the Company. and the Company desires to grant such
rights upon the terms and conditions of the Agreement.·· At the time the Separation Agreement
was signed, Archibald had been terminated. The essence of the agreement was to transfer certain
rights to Archibald in exchange for payment. Plaintiffs had. at a minimum, a suspicion the

24

Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 551 cmt.j. (1976) (emphasis added.).

"Materiality also relates to justifiable reliance as discussed in more detail infi-a.
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Archibald had violated his Noncompetition Obligations but did not elect to pursue enforcement of
the Noncompetition Obligations. The fact that Plaintiffs would like to have known that Archibald
had violated his Noncompetition Obligations and. as they allege, would not have entered into the
Separation Agreement had they known this fact. may make the fact material, but does not make
the fact a basis for the Separation Agreement.
Even if Archibald's adherence to his Noncompetition Obligations was a basis for the
Separation agreement. Plaintiffs have failed to prove Archibald knew they were entering into the
Separation Agreement under a mistaken belief that he had not violated his Noncompetition
Obligations. Archibald knew that Plaintiffs and Marsh were negotiating Marsh· s separation from
ITP. During these negotiations, Plaintiffs became aware of Prodigy and as a result Archibald
was escorted from !TP" s business premises but was allowed to return after Marsh met with
Collins. In light of the Plaintiffs· reaction to the Prodigy Incident it was reasonable for Archibald
to believe that Plaintiffs, at least, suspected he had violated his Noncompetition Obligations.
Notwithstanding these facts, Plaintiffs still desired to enter into the Separation Agreement. Not
only did Plaintiffs fail to present evidence that Archibald knew they were mistaken about
adherence to his Noneompetition Obligations. Archibald testified that he believed Plaintiffs knew
he had not honored his Noncompetition Obligations.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them and Archibald with
respect to the Separation Agreement. Plaintiffs have also failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Archibald knew Plaintiffs were entering into the Separation Agreement under a
mistake as to a fact basic to the Separation Agreement. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to
establish that Archibald had a duty to disclose his solicitation of the Two Orders.
18
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b. Archibald's knowledge of the materiality of his solicitation of the Two Orders.
Even assuming Archibald had a duty to disclose, he was only required to disclose those matters
he knew Plaintiffs regarded as important in determining their course of action with respect to the
Separation Agreement. 26 A party can be liable for nondisclosure ofa material fact only if the
party has knowledge of the fact and its materiality. Because a party cannot be liable for
nondisclosure of a fact that he does not know is material, he obviously cannot be liable for failure
to disclose of a fact that is not material. Not only was there no reason for Archibald to know that
his solicitation of the Two Orders was material to Plaintiffs decision to enter into the Separation
Agreement. the evidence shows that it was not material.
Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Archibald knew that his
solicitation of the Two Orders was material to Plaintiffs· decision to enter into the Separation
Agreement. Much of the same evidence that lead this Court to conclude that Archibald didn't
know that Plaintiffs were mistaken about his adherence to his Noncompetition Obligations also
leads the Corn1 to conclude that Archibald didn't know this fact was material.
In particular. Plaintiffs' reaction to the Prodigy Incident was reason for Archibald to
believe that Plaintiffs, at least, suspected he had violated his Noncompetition Obligations.
Notwithstanding this fact. Plaintiffs still desired to enter into the Separation Agreement.
Additionally, Plaintiffs had no discussions with Archibald until the signing of the Separation
Agreement. 'Nhile negotiating" the Separation Agreement, Plaintiffs never informed Archibald
that any violation of his Noncompetition Obligations was impo11ant to them and never asked a

"'Restatement
27

s 551 (I) and cmt a.

The court uses the term ·'negotiating'' ver} loosely because the evidence shows there
was viitually no negotiation.
19
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question regarding the same. Because the purpose of the Separation Agreement was noi to
enforce Archibald's Noncompetition Obligations. and Plaintiffs never informed Archibald that
any violation of his Noncompetition Obligations was important to them and they asked no
questions about potential violations of the Noncompetition Obligations. it was reasonable for
Archibald to conclude that his solicitation of the Two Orders was not important to Plaintiffs.
Consequently. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Archibald kneH they regarded violations of
his Noncompetition Obligations as important in determining their course of action with respect to
the Separation Agreement.
Not only was it reasonable for Archibald to conclude that his solicitation of the Two
Orders was not material. the evidence also shows that Archibald's solicitation of the Two Orders
was not material to Plaintiffs· decision with respect to the Separation Agreement. It was
important to Plaintiffs that ITP salesmen honor their non-compete agreements and it was material
to their continued employment with ITP. However. the issue in this case is not Archibald's
continued employment with ITP. but is Archibald's separation from ITP. The evidence is that
lTP had, on at least one occasion. entered into an agreement similar to Archibald's Separation
Agreement, with a former salesman notwithstanding the former salesman·s violation of his
noncompetition agreement. Although Collins testified that Archibald's adherence to the
Noncompetition Obligations were of great importance and materiality. his actions at the time of
the Separation Agreement show otherwise. Prior to any discussions with Archibald, Plaintiffs
were willing to terminate Archibald's Noncompetition Obligations as evidenced by the Marsh
Separation Agreement stating that Archibald's Noncompetition Obligations were "tenninated and
cancelled and of no further force or effect." Prior to meeting with Archibald, all terms ofthe
Separation Agreement. other than the X-List and Y-List. had been reduced to writing.

20
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The doubtful materiality of Archibald's solicitation of the Two Orders is frniher
highlighted by the fact that Plaintiffs didn't ask Archibald a single question about possible
violations of his Noncompetition Obligations. Archibald would not have been esc01ied from the
ITP business offices had the management of ITP not. at least suspected that Archibald was
somehow involved with Prodigy" and had violated his Noncompetition Obligations. Even
though Plaintiffs expressly placed the risk as to the existence of facts on themselves. had
know ledge that Prodigy was in existence and operating prior to Janumy I 0. 2007 and, at a
minimum. suspected Archibald was involved with Prodigy. Plaintiffa never asked a single
question, or infonned Archibald, about this matter that was allegedly so imponant to them.
ln sum, the evidence shows that: (I) ITP had. on at least one occasion. entered in an
agreement similar to Archibald's Separation Agreement with an employee that had violated his
noncompetition agreement. (2) Plaintiffs were willing to tenninate Archibald's Noncompetition
Obligations before talking to Archibald, (3) notwithstanding an express provision in a contract
prepared by Plaintiffs and their knowledge of potential violations of Archibald's Noncompetition
Obligations, failed to ask Archibald a single question about this allegedly material fact, and (4)
Plaintiffs never told Archibald that any breach of his Noncompetition Obligations was material to
them.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Archibald knew
that any breach of his Noncompetition Obligations was material to Plaintiffo. In fact, the

"Although Collins testified that he had no recollection of ordering that Archibald be
escrn1ed from the ITP business offices, Collins offers no explanation of why Archibald would be
escorted from the lTP ofiices after the controller's discovery of a Prodigy related document.
Absent any other explanation. the only reasonable conclusion is that Collins believed that
Archibald was somehow involved in Prodigy's activities in violation of his non-compete
agreement.
21
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preponderance of the evidence shows Archibald"s breach of bis Noncompetition Obligations was
not material to Plaintiffs. Consequently .t>uchibald"s failure to disclose his solicitation of the Two
Orders does not constitute a false representation of a material fact.

2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish An Intent to Deceive. Even if Archibald"s failure
to disclose that he had solicited the Two Orders in violation of his Noncompetition Obligations
was a false representation of a material fact. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Archibald
failed to disclose this fact with the intent to deceive. Plaintiffs place great emphasis on
Archibald"s failure to disclose. arguing that this failure evidences dishonesty and Archibald"s
fraudulent intent. While the court is not condoning Archibald"s actions. and recognizes that an
intent to deceive may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.'" failure to disclose. by
itself, does not establish the requisite intent to deceive. A creditor must show that the debtor
failed to disclose material facts. with an intent to deceive in direct connection with the
transaction. 30

fntent is a ·'determination to act in a certain way or to do a certain thing:· 31 As the Tenth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has stated ... the touchstone to a finding of intent to deceive is
the speaker"s actual subjective state of mind- i.e .. the speaker"s actual knowledge and belief-· at
the time the misrepresentation is made:·'' While Restatement ~ 55 l(l) addresses the
nondisclosing parties knowledge of materiality of an undisclosed fact. the relying patty must also
'"Riebesell, at 791.
30

111 re Davis. 246 B.R. 646, 652 (I 0th Cir. BAP 2000)(Affzrmed in part. vacated and
remanded in part on other grounds, 2002 WL 1044832).
)1Black's I.aw Dictionary.
12

DSC National Properties LLCv. Johnson. No. 11-105. 2012 WL 3399614. at *9 (BAP
10th Cir. August 15. 2012).
22
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show that the nondisclosing party intended, or was determined to not disclose a material fact with
an intent to deceive. ln any business transaction. there are virtually an unlimited number of

undisclosed facts. If the nondisclosing party does not know that an undisclosed fact is important
or material to the other party, or that the other party is relying on the nonexistence of the fact the
nondisclosing party can not fmm the requisite intent to not disclose the fact
Plaintiffs have failed to establish Archibald's intent. because. as discussed above, the1
have failed to establish that Archibald knew that they regarded his adherence to his
Noncompetition Obligations as mate1ial in making their decision to enter into the Separation
Agreement. Plaintiffs did solicit testimony from Archibald that his solicitation of the Two Orders
was infonnation Plaintiffs would like to know. but that is different than testimony that he knew
his solicitation of the Two Orders was material to Plaintiffs· decision to enter into the Separation
Agreement. In fact Archibald's testimony was that he thought Plaintiffs knew, or at least
suspected, that he had violated his Noncompetition Obligations. Even if Archibald knew that any
violation of his N oncompetition Obligations was material, his belief that Plaintiffs already knew
he had potentially violated them, evidences his lack of interest to deceive.
Given all of the facts and circumstances discussed above, it was reasonable for Archibald
to conclude that Plaintiffs knew of his activities related to Prodigy and that those activities were
not material to the Plaintiffs· decision to enter into the Separation Agreement Based on the
totality of the circumstances, the Court can not infer that Archibald had an intent to deceive
Plaintiffs by not disclosing the Two Orders.

3, Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Actual Reliance. Proving that a creditor actually
relied is a separate and distinct element of§ 523(a)(2) and must be proven by the creditor even
where an exceptionally strong showing is made that the debtor made false representations with
23
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the intent to deceive 31 Reliance may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The court must
determine a creditor's reliance based upon the facts and circumstances present in the particular
case and not based upon industry standards."
Plaintiffs have not introduced any facts. let alone proved. that they relied on anything
Archibald said or didn't say. Absent any discussions with Archibald, the Marsh Separation
Agreement released Archibald from his Noncompetition Obligations. Absent any discussions
with Archibald, Plaintiffs caused the Separation Agreement to be prepared and the Separation
Agreement disavows any actual reliance. In light of the above, any argumern that the Plaintiffs
actually relied upon a nondisclosure by Archibald prior to entering into the Separation Agreement
is without merit

4. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Justified Reliance. The standard for excepting a
debt from discharge as a fraudulent representation within the meaning of t523(a)(2)(A) is not
reasonable reliance hut the less demanding one of justifiable reliance. Even under the justifiable
reliance standard. ·'a person is required to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly relies
upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be patent to him ifhc had utilized his
opportunity to make a cursory examination or investigation." 3' Justifiable reliance does not apply
"where. under the circumstances. the facts should be apparent to one of his knowledge and
intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered something which should serve as a
warning that he is being deceived. that he is required to make an investigation of his own.''' In
31

/n re: Mullet, 817 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1987).

14

1n re Cribbs. 327 B.R. 668 (10th Cir. BAP 2005).

"Fieldv. Mans, 516 U.S. 59. 71 (1995).
'"Id .. at 71.
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determining whether a creditor·s reliance was justifiable. a court should examine the qualities and
characteristics of the panicular plaintiff. and the circumstances of the pai1icular case. rather than
applying a community standard of conduct to all cases."
As stated previously. Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice .of the possibility that Archibald
was involved and perfonning work for Prodigy prior to .January 23. 2007. Inquiry notice occurs
when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require funher
inquiry on his part. ,.;s "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the pany on his
guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a
person has sufficient information lo lead him to a fact. he shall be deemed conversant of it. " 1''
Even under a "'justifiably relied'' test. the plaintiff must use his senses and at least make a cursory
examination or investigation of the facts of the transaction before entering into it. 40
In addition to inquiry notice, the facts are that Collins had actual notice that Archibald was
involved with Prodigy prior to entering into the Separation Agreement. It is undisputed that
Collins entered into the Marsh Separation Agreement prior to entering into Archibald's
Separation Agreement Paragraphs 4. and 5. Of the Marsh Separation Agreement expressly
recognized the existence of Prodigy and expressly recognized an affiliation of Archibald with
Prodigy. The Marsh Separation Agreement put Collins on actual notice of Archibald's affiliation
with Prodigy prior to Collins entering into the Separation Agreement with Archibald.

''In re Riebesell. 586 F.3d 782. 792 (I 0th Cir. 2009).
'"First American Title Insurance Co v. J.B. Ranch. Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah
1998)( citation omitted).
19

Salt Lake, G. & W. Ry. Co. V. Allied Materials Co .. 291 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah
1955)(quoting O'Reillv v. McLean. 37 P.2d 770,775) (1934).
40

Riebesell. at 792.
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If as Plaintiffs argue. Archibald"s breach of his noncompetition agreement was material,
they clearly had knowledge of facts that should have excited attention and lead to some
investigation on their part. Not only did Plaintiffs have knowledge of the facts that should have
lead to some investigation. paragraph 6.( c) of the Separation Agreement obligated them to
conduct heir own investigation. It is undisputed that Archibald made no disclosure of his
activities, but Plaintiffs offered no evidence that, given the information they had and the
obligation they had assumed, they made even a cursory examination or investigation of the facts
material to them. Any reliance on Archibald"s nondisclosure is therefore not justified.

5. Actual Loss. Plaintiffs rely on the Separation Agreement to support their claim of
loss. The Separation Agreement calls for payment of $90.000 according to the terms of a
promissory note attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs argue that the X list customers had a minimum
value to !TP of$90.000. Although the Cou1i believes the Plaintiffs· calculation of loss is
reasonable. the loss must be caused by Archibald"s fraud or false representation to he excepted
from discharge under§ 523(a)(2)(A). Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish Archibald"s
fraud or false representation, there can be no resulting damages.
B. Plaintiffs' Section 727 Claims.

Plaintiffs seek denial of Archibald's discharge under l l U.S.C.

~

727(a)(2) & (5) and

argue that Archibald. with intent lo hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. namely Plaintiffs.
transferred prope1iy within one year of the petition date and that Archibald failed to satisfactorily
explain the loss of assets or deficiency of assets. The Plaintiffs· allegations with respect to the
§ 727 claims are focused entirely on Archibald"s equity interest in Brand Makers.

1. Plaintifrs Section 727(a)(2) Claim. To obtain a denial of discharge under
§727(a)(2)(A), a plaintiff must prove: 1) that a transfer ofprope1iy occurred: 2) that the debtor

26
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owned the property transferred; 3) that the transfer occurred within one year of filing the petition;
and 4) that the debtor had. at the time of the transfer, the intent to defraud a creditor. 41 To deny a
discharge under§ 727(a)(2). a coun must find actual intent to defraud creditors. 42 The
Bankruptcy Code must be construed liberally in favor of the debtor and strictly against the
creditor."
Because showing direct evidence of actual intent can be difficult. "fraudulent intent to
conceal assets may be established by circumstantial evidence, or by inferences drawn from the
course of conduct. ·• 44 Actions from which fraudulent intent may be inferred include situations in
which a debtor: conceals prebankruptcy conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets;
conve1is nonexempt assets to exempt assets immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition; gratuitously transfers property; continues to use transferred prope1iy; and, transfers
propeny to family members.'15 Courts also consider the monetary value of the assct. 46

Other

indicia of fraud include: obtaining credit to purchase exempt propeny; conversion of property
after entry of a large judgment against the debtor; the debtor had engaged in a pattern of sharp

41

111 re: Sec\v, 215 B.R. 780. 788-89 (10th Cir. BAP 1997).

"In re FVarren, 512 F.3d 1241. 1249 (10th Cir. 2008), Marine Midland Bus. Loans. Inc.
r. Carey (In re Carey), 938 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1991 ).
41

111 re Brown, ]08 F.3d 1290, ]292 (10th Cir. 1997).

44

Farmers Co-op Assoc. o(Talmage. Kansas v. Strunk. 671 F.2d 391,395 (]0th Cir.

45

Marinc Midland Business Loans

1982).
1'.

Carey (In re Carey). 938 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir.

1991).

461d.
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dealing prior to bankruptcy: the conversion of the asset rendered the debtor insolvent."' ··The
cases. however. are peculiarly fact specific. and the activity in each situation must be viewed
individually. ··4'
Plaintiffs· position is that the Transfer was a sham transaction only designed to hinder.
delay or defraud them. Plaintiffs argue that Archibald" s fraudulent intent should be inferred
because the evidence supports a finding of the following multiple indicia of fraud: (I) the transfer
occurred immediately before Archibald filed his bankruptcy petition: (2) the transfer was
gratuitous: (3) Archibald continued to use the transferred asset: (4) the transfer was to a family
member: (5) the transfer occmTed after entry ofa large judgement: (5) Archibald engaged in a
pattern of sharp dealing prior to bankruptcy: (6) Archibald became insolvent as a result of the
transfer: and. (7) the asset transferred was valuable.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs· assertions. after careful consideration of the evidence. and
viewing the specific facts that are peculiar to this case and the activity in each situation, the Com1
can not conclude that Archibald transferred his prope1ty with actual intent to hinder delay or
defraud a creditor. Plaintiffs have failed to establish even one of the alleged indicia of fraud and
their list of indicia is simply an attempt to convince the Cou11 there is something where there is
nothing." 9 The evidence Plaintiffs introduced on their§ 727(a)(2) claim is not only unsubstantial
and confusing but is potentially contradictory. The Court finds it particularly interesting that

47

Id. at note 4.

48Jd.
4

"ldioms like ·'where there is smoke there is fire"" and "everything but the kitchen sink'"
come to mind.
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Plaintiffs place so much emphasis on the lack of formality and documentation with respect to the
Transfer - the suggestion being that there was no transfer. If there was no transfer of Archibald's
ownership interest in Brand Makers, then both the§ 717(a)(2) and the§ 727(a)(5) claims must

faiL
What the evidence clearly shows is that Brand Makers was founded by Archibald and
James Greaves. Brand Makers operated at a substantial loss and Thomas Greaves loaned a very
significant amount of money to Brand Makers. Brand Makers entered into promissory notes and
security agreements with Thomas Greaves which were personally guaranteed by Archibald and
James Greaves. Brand Makers failed to make payments to Thomas Greaves.
The evidence is less clear on what transpired after Brand Makers failed to make payments
to Thomas Greaves. Thomas Greaves sent the February 2010 E-mail addressed to James Greaves
which stated that the e-mail was to formalize his taking possession and control of l 00% of the
equity in Brand Makers and that Thomas Greaves was exercising his right as outlined in the
security agreement. There is no evidence that Thomas Greaves ever formally foreclosed on Brand
Maker's assets or Archibald's equity interest. Thomas Greaves has never asserted any deficiency
with respect to the Brand Makers debt. In his Statement of Affairs. Archibald disclosed that he
had transfen-ed his equity interest is Brand Makers to Thomas Greaves. but there is no
documentation regarding the Transfer.
Archibald did not receive ownership draws after Februmy 2010 but was paid as an
employee/independent contractor. The evidence does not show that after February 24,2010,
Archibald exercised control over Brand Makers. Significantly, he lost the ability to receive draws
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from Brand Makers. he lost his ability to hire and fire employees. and he lost the ability to guide
the direction of Brand Makers.
Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that Thomas Greaves loaned Brand Makers
significant sums of money before the promissory note. security agreement and personal
guarantees were signed and that there is no document evidencing Archibald"s pledge of his equity
interest in Brand Makers to Thomas Greaves. However. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to
contradict the fact the Archibald agreed that Thomas Greaves would be entitled to his equity
interest if Brand Makers defaulted on its obligation to Thomas Greaves. Improper documentation
of an agreement may create issues related to enforceability. but it does not negate actions taken
pursuant to agreement.
The first indicia of fraud the Court will address is Plaintiffs' assertion that Archibald
continued to use his equity interest in Brand makers after the Transfer. The only evidence that
Plaintiffs have introduced to support their contention is that. after the Trans fer. Archibald held
himself out as a founder of Brand Makers. has remained employed by Brand Makers. was Brand
Makers· Rule 30(b )( 6) designee. has acted as a representative of Brand Makers. was Brand
Makers head salesman. was authorized to sign checks. and he assisted in management. It is true
that if an individual transfers an asset or ownership interest but then continues to exercise
dominion over it. fraud can be infened. 50 Unfortunately for Plaintiffs. the foregoing facts are not
inconsistent with an employee's duties and do not necessarily evidence that Archibald remained
an owner of Brand Makers after February 2010 or that he used. controlled any equity interest in
Brand Makers or that he exercised dominion or control over Brand Makers. It is an unwarranted

S<'Brown, at 1293.
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leap to infer fraud anytime a person transfers an equity interest in an entity but continues to be
employed by the entity.
Not only are the foregoing facts consistent with Archibald"s transfer of his equity interest
to Thomas Greaves but the additional evidence suppmis the conclusion that the transfer of Brand
Makers to Thomas Greaves was not a sham and is more probable than Archibald's continued
control over his equity interest. Thomas Greaves was a substantial creditor of Brand Makers.
There was an agreement between Archibald. James Greave and Thomas Greaves that if Brand
Makers failed to repay Thomas Greaves as agreed, then Thomas Greaves would be entitled to
take control of Brand Makers. The evidence also shows that the Transfer was more in the nature
of an involuntary transfer. It was initiated by Thomas Greaves. who at the time was a creditor
that was owed a substantial sum of money. The evidence is that Thomas Greaves sent the
Febrnary 2010 E-mail announcing that he was taking control of Brand Makers to enforce the
promissory note and security agreement.
Plaintiffs take issue with the lack of fmmality with respect to the transfer of Brand Makers
to Thomas Greaves. The lack of formality is only one factor to consider when looking at the
totality of the circumstances. The formality of the Transfer may raise a multitude of issues
unrelated to this lawsuit. but the Court finds those issues are of little imp01iance in this case.
Another badge of fraud the Plaintiffs argue is that the transfer of Archibald" s equity in
Brand Makers was largely gratuitous. The Court finds this argument baffling. The
uncontroverted evidence is that Brand Makers owed Thomas Greaves a lot of money and
Archibald had personally guaranteed that debt. In an effmi to secure desperately needed
financing for Brand Makers. in addition to guaranteeing the promissory note. Archibald agreed
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that his equity interest would severe as collateral for Thomas Greaves. Even absent any prior
agreement. a transfer of an asset in satisfaction of significant debt is not gratuitous. The Transfer
may lack documentation or formality. or even be preferential. but it is no! gratuitous.
Plaintiffs attempt to make an issue of the fact that there is no written secmity agreement
with respect to Archibald"s equity interest in Brand Makers. In the context of this§ 727(a)(2)
action and looking at the totality of the circumstances. the Court finds this fact to be unimpottant.
The issue before the court is not the enforceability of the agreement between Archibald. James
Greaves and Thomas Greaves. or even whether the transfer was an avoidable transfer. but
whether the transfer of Archibald"s equity in Brand Makers to Thomas Greaves was a transfer by
Archibald with intent to hinder. delay or defraud a creditor. Failure to properly document an
agreement by itself does not evidence actual intent to defraud.
Fmthcr the transfer of Brand Makers to Thomas Greaves is not only consistent with the
parties agreement but consistent with well established law. Thomas Greaves was a substantial
creditor of Brand Makers and. in an orderly liquidation. would be entitled to be paid from Brand
Makers before Archibald or Arcbibald"s creditors. The agreement to transfer Brand Makers to
Thomas Greaves might have been a preferential transfer with respect to Brand Maker creditors.
but the evidence does not show it was a fraudulent transfer with respect to Archibald's creditors.
The next indicia of fraud the Court will address is the value ofArchibald"s equity interest
in Brand Makers. The uncontroverted evidence is that Brand Makers was deeply in debt. unable
to support itself and unable to make payments to it largest creditor. Absent any other evidence,
the Court can conclude that Archibald"s equity interest in Brand Makers was of little or no value.
There is no other evidence of value. Plaintiffs ,u-gue that because Thomas Greaves deems Brand
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Makers· debts satisfied, there is an implied value of Archibald"s interest in Brand Makers of at
least $200,000. The Court sees no such implication. That fact that Thomas Greaves may at this
time. deem Brand Makers· debts satisfied. is not evidence of value at the time Thomas Greaves
took over Brand Makers. Thomas Greaves may deem Brand Makers' debt satisfied because he
received control and ownership of Brand Makers in exchange for the debt. Archibald·s interest in
Brand Makers was of little value. and the transfer of an asset of little or no value provides little
evidence of intent to hinder. delay or defraud a creditor.
The next indicia of fraud the Plaintiffs· argue is Archibald"s pattern of sharp dealing as
evidenced by the .Judgment Meeting and the timing of the Transfer. Sharp dealing is not a
specifically defined term but is generally viewed as ·'unethical action and trickery."' 51 Even if
Archibald and James Greaves represented to Collins at the Judgment Meeting that Archibald was
an owner of Brand Makers and that Brand Makers owed Thomas Greaves a substantial debt.
Plaintiffs have offered no evidence or even an argument, that such a misrepresentation caused
Plaintiffs to be hindered. delayed or defrauded in any way and have not articulated any advantage
Archibald would have gained from such a misrepresentation. If Archibald had disclosed that he
no longer held an interest in Brand Makers then what° How would Plaintiffs be better off if
Archibald had disclosed the Transfer" What benefit did Archibald obtain by not disclosing the
Transfer? Plaintiffs do not address any of these questions.
Plaintiffs also argue that ··the timing of the transfer of Archibald"s interest in Brand
Makers is suspect and evidences a pattern of sharp dealing."' The timing. Plaintiffs argue. is
suspect because Brand Makers never made a payment to Thomas Greaves and had been in default

"In re Sissom. 366 B.R. 677. 700 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Tex. 2007).
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for five months. They also argue that Thomas Greaves has not asserted a deficiency or executed
on Brand Makers· property." From this evidence, the Court can not conclude that Archibald
engaged in '·sharp dealing:· What the Com1 can conclude. is that the evidence does not establish
a "pattern -- and Plaintiffs have failed to show that Archibald engaged in a "pattern of sharp
dealing:·
The remaining indicia of fraud that the Plaintiffs argue can be addresses more summarily.
The Transfer was not to a family member. 51 was not after a large judgment," and did not occur
immediately before tbe petition date. 5'
Plaintiffs have not met their burden under§ 727(a)(2) to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Transfer was made with an intent to defraud Archibald's creditors.
2. Section 727(a)(5). As to the§ 727(a)(5) count. the party objecting to a debtor·s
discharge under§ 727(a)(5) has the burden of proving facts establishing that a loss or shrinkage
of Archibald's assets actually occurred.''" Plaintiffs have failed to show that a loss or shrinkage
of assets actually occurred. Based upon the sizable and persistent operating losses experienced by

"As previously noted, the evidence is confusing on what transpired after the February
2010 E-mail. Thomas Greaves may not be asserting a deficiency because he has taken over
Brand Makers and there is no need to execute on the property.
51

Archibald's ex-wife is the sister of.James Greaves·s wife. Thomas Greaves is James
Greaves· father.
54

The Transfer occurred several months prior to Plaintiffs' judgment against Archibald.

55

Given the facts in this case, the Court does not consider the Transfer that occurred
seven months before the petition date to be a transfer immediately before the petition date. The
fact that a transfer occurred in close proximity to the banlauptcy petition date is not per se
evidence of fraud, for purposes of § 727. In re Stcwan. 263 B.R. 608. 613 (10th Cir. BAP
2001).
56

111 re Sr<!wart, 263 B.R. 608. 618 (10th Cir. BAP '.WO]).
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Brand Makers leading up to February 20 I 0, and the substantial debt faced by Brand Makers. and
with no evidence to the contrary. the Court can only conclude that in February 2010. Archibald"s
equity interest in Brand Makers was of little or no value. The transfer of an asset that has little or
no value in exchange for full or partial satisfaction of an antecedent debt of substantial size.
without more, does not result in a loss or deficiency of assets and will not trigger denial of a
discharge under§ 727(a)(5).
Even assuming that Plaintiffs have proved a loss or deficiency of assets occurred.

Archibald did explain the loss. The explanation is, as Plaintiffs argue. that the asset was
transferred to Thomas Greaves.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs have failed
to establish by a preponderance of evidence that their debt was obtained by "false pretense. a false
representation, or actual fraud. Therefore, Plaintiffs· debt should not be excepted from discbarge
under§ 523(a)(2)(A).
Based on the foregoing. the Court also concludes, as a matter oflaw. that Plaintiffs have
failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Archibald. '·with intent to hinder. delay. or
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has
transferred, removed. destroyed. mutilated or concealed - (A) property of the debtor, within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition." Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that
Archibald "failed to explain satisfactorily .... any loss of assets or deficiency to meet"" his
liabilities. Therefore, Archibald should be granted a discharge under 11 U.S.C § 727.
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_ _0000000 _ _
SERVICE LIST
Service of the foregoing Memorandum Decision will be effected through the Bankruptcy
Noticing Center to the following pai1ies.
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Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere
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Salt Lake City. UT 84121
Kevin Wmihy
Sumsion Business Law. LLC
Wells Fargo Center
86 N. University Ave.
Suite 400
Provo. UT 84601
Steven R. Sumsion
Sumsion Business Law. LLC
Wells Fargo Center
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